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Trafficking in Information: Evaluating
the Efficacy of the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of
2010
ByALEXANDRA PROKOPETS*
Abstract: The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of
2010 (CTSCA) took effect in January 2012. It was designed in an
effort to eradicate forced labor and human trafficking in business
supply chains, which the legislature recognized as violations of state,
federal, and international law. The CTSCA does not forbid the sale
of goods produced through trafficked labor. Instead, the CTSCA
asks companies to disclose their labor practices to consumers in order
to allow buyers to differentiate companies based on their efforts to
supply products free from slavery and trafficking, which will in turn
inform consumers' purchasing decisions and drive companies to pay
closer attention to their own supply chains. After explaining the
requirements of the CTSCA, this article applies Archon Fung and
colleagues' framework for successful transparency regulation to
analyze the likely efficacy of the CTSCA. The analysis finds that
while the CTSCA meets three of the five essential elements for a
successful disclosure regulation, the law fails to meet crucial aspects
of having a defined information structure and vehicle, and also lacks
an enforcement mechanism. Furthermore, the information disclosed
under the CTSCA regime is unlikely to become adequately
embedded in users' routine decision-making to affect the purchase of
goods, a necessary aspect for success. Therefore, the CTSCA is not
likely to help eradicate forced labor and human trafficking.
351
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
I. Introduction
In 1865, slavery was officially abolished in the United States with
the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. At
the peak of the transatlantic slave trade, approximately 80,000 slaves
were shipped from Africa to the new world.2 Today, it is estimated
that about 27 million men, women, boys, girls, U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals are victims of modern-day slavery, known as human
trafficking, around the globe.3 Human trafficking for labor and
commercial sex services occurs when people profit from the control
and exploitation of others through the use of force, fraud or
coercion.4 Trafficking victims are generally confined against their
will, often in inhumane conditions, and "have typically been
[coerced], lied to, threatened, [physically and sexually] assaulted,
raped,"5 and deprived of adequate food, shelter, and medical services.
Currently a 32 billion dollar enterprise, human trafficking is among
the top three criminal industries in the world.6 Specifically, $13,000
per year is generated on average by each "forced laborer," and this
7
number can reach up to $67,200 per victim per year.
As economic globalization continues, business supply chains are
becoming more complex, increasing in -layers and parties, and
exacerbating the difficulties in tracking where and how labor abuses
occur. Simultaneously, the push to alleviate and eventually eradicate
*Juris Doctor Candidate 2014, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law; B.A. 2009, University of Maryland, College Park, Criminology & Criminal
Justice, Sociology. The author would like to thank Professor Jodi Short for her
instructive commentary and invaluable guidance on earlier drafts of this article, the
editors of HICLR for their assistance, the Summer 2012 Polaris Project Fellowship
Class for their inspiration, and her family for their unconditional support.
1. U.S. Const., amend. XIII, § 1.
2. NICHOLAS D. KRISTOFF & SHERYL WUDUNN, HALF THE SKY: TURNING
OPPRESSION INTO OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN WORLDWIDE 10 (2009).
3. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2012)
[hereinafter TIP REPORT 2012]; KEVIN BALES & RON SOODALTER, THE SLAVE NEXT
DOOR: HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN AMERICA TODAY 3 (2009).
4. Trafficking Victims Protection Act § 103 (8) (2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/61124.htm.
5. TIP REPORT 2012, supra note 3, at 11.
6. Int'l Labor Office, A global alliance against forced labour, Report I (B) 55
(2005), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ednorm/@declaratio
n/documents/publication/wcms_081882.pdf.
7. Id. at 55-56.
8. TIP REPORT 2012, supra note 3, at 26; FREE2WORK, http://www.fr
ee2work.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
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labor trafficking, is gaining momentum as grassroots organizations
have vigorously advocated for corporate transparency and developed
tools to enhance consumer awareness of labor trafficking. Consumers
have begun to consider their individual roles in perpetuating modern-
day slavery through technological tools such as the Slavery Footprint
website 9 or the Free2Work rating site and mobile application.1o The
goal of the latter tool is to rate companies according to their use of
forced labor practices and relay information to consumers in
comprehensible terms to change consumer purchasing decisions."
While community members and advocacy groups have led the
fight against labor trafficking, state and federal legislators have also
attempted to craft creative and effective solutions to the broader
problem of human trafficking. Since the United Nations' adoption of
the Palermo Protocol in 200012 (the first international effort to define
and address human trafficking), 1 3 over 125 nationS14 and fifty15 states
and the District of Columbia within the United States, have adopted
laws prohibiting human trafficking, and providing penalties for
9. Established in 2011, this website allows individuals to calculate the number of
slaves they employ through their everyday consumption. SLAVERY FOOTPRINT,
http://slaveryfootprint.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
10. This campaign is a vision of the non-profit organization Not For Sale. The
application allows consumers to access information and company performance
regarding the child and forced labor practices for their favorite brands and products.
FREE2WORK, http://www.free2work.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
11. Id.
12. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supp. the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Annex II, 2004, available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Conventio
n/TOCebook-e.pdf.
13. Jonathan Todres, The Pivate Sector's Pivotal Role in Combating Human
Trafficking, 3 CALIF. L. REV. 80,84, Feb. 2012.
14. Id.
15. On February 27, 2013, Wyoming became the fiftieth and final state to
pass anti-trafficking legislation. Press Release, Polaris Project and International
Justice Mission, Wyoming Becomes 50th State to Outlaw Human Trafficking (Feb.
27, 2013), available at http://www.polarisproject.org/media-center/news-and-
press/press-releases/721-senate-passage-of-tvpra-signals-strong-commitment-to-
eradicate-human-trafficking. See also Joan Barron, Wyoming Legislature passes bill
to outlaw human trafficking, STAR-TRIBUNE, Feb. 20, 2013, Wyoming Legislature
passes bill to outlaw human trafficking, STAR-TRIBUNE, Feb. 20, 2013, available at
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/wyoming-legislature-passes-
bill-to-outlaw-human-traffickingarticlec56a55fe-3337-52e0-b7e9-b2df7bf7f637.html.
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perpetrators and services for victims. At the federal level, the United
States enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in
2000, and the fourth subsequent reauthorization of the act passed the
16Senate on February 12, 2013. These laws are examples of
"[s]ignificant legislative efforts [that] have been made to capture and
punish the perpetrators of [sex and labor trafficking] crimes, 1 as well
as to "provide victims with necessary protections and [services]."'s
However, the "market is [a] key impetus for [labor trafficking]
crimes, and legislative efforts to [specifically target] the market for
goods and products tainted by slavery and trafficking have been
lacking." 19 In light of this lack of legislation that specifically targets
the labor market, policy makers have begun experimenting with a
different approach, namely, a mandatory disclosure regime for
companies to provide to consumers information on their labor and
human rights practices. "Targeted transparency represents a
distinctive category of public policies that, at their most basic level,
mandate disclosure by corporations or other actors of standardized,
comparable, and disaggregated information regarding specific
products or practices to a broad audience in order to achieve a public
policy purpose." 20 California has taken this legal approach to combat
the problem of forced labor and slavery in business supply chains.
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010
(CTSCA), which took effect in January 2012, was designed in an
effort to eradicate forced labor and human trafficking in business
supply chains, which the legislature recognized as violations of state,
federal and international law.21 This particular law does not forbid
the sale of goods produced through trafficked labor. Instead, the
CTSCA asks companies to disclose their labor practices to consumers
in order to allow buyers to "distinguish companies on the merits of
16. Press Release, Polaris Project, Senate Passage of TVPRA Signals
Strong Commitment to Eradicate Human Trafficking (Feb. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.polarisproject.org/media-center/news-and-press/press-releases/721-
senate-passage-of-tvpra-signals-strong-commitment-to-eradicate-human-trafficking.
17. The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, codified
as Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.43 and Cal. Rev. and Tax Code § 19547.5
[hereinafter "CTSCA"], § 1714.43(2)(d)(West)(2012).
18. CTSCA at § 1714.43 (2)(e).
19. Id. at § 1714.43(2)(f), emphasis added.
20. FUNG AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY,
37-38 (2007).
21. CTSCA at § 1714.43.
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their efforts to supply products free from the taint of slavery and
traffickin ," which will in turn inform consumers' purchasing
decisions and drive companies to pay closer attention to their own
supply chains.
Scholars have argued that disclosure regulation can do more than
simply provide information, that it can actually change practices.23
Research suggests that transparency policies are most effective when
the following elements are met: (1) the regime has a specific policy
purpose with (2) specified discloser targets, (3) a defined scope of
information, (4) an explicated information structure and vehicle, and
(5) an enforcement mechanism.24 In addition to meeting these
conditions, a transparency regime is most effective when the disclosed
information becomes "embedded" in subsequent user and discloser
decisions because the information and user actions are valuable,
compatible, and comprehensive to both parties.25 In the case of the
CTSCA, the law sufficiently meets only three of the five conditions
necessary for a successful transparency policy, and the information
disclosed under this regime is unlikely to become adequately
embedded in users' routine decision-making to affect the purchase of
goods. Therefore, the CTSCA is not likely to help eradicate forced
labor and human trafficking.
II. What does CTSCA require?
The CTSCA requires every retail seller and manufacturer doing
business in the state of California that has annual worldwide gross
profits that exceed one hundred million dollars, to disclose its efforts
to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from its direct supply
chains for tangible goods offered for sale, via an easily identifiable
link on the homepage of the company's website.26
Specifically, the law outlines five key components which must be
included on the website regarding whether, and to what extent, the
manufacturer or retail seller: (1) verifies product supply chains to
evaluate and address risks of human trafficking and slavery and
whether the verification was conducted by a third party, (2) conducts
22. Id. at § 1714.43 (2)(h)(i).
23. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 39.
24. Id. at 39.
25. Id. at 55, 65.
26. CTSCA at § 1714.43(3)(a)(1).
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supplier audits to evaluate compliance with company standards for
trafficking and slavery, and whether such audits were independent
and unannounced, (3) requires direct suppliers to certify that
component materials used in products comply with the laws regarding
slavery and human trafficking of the country or countries in which
they are doing business, (4) maintains internal accountability
standards and procedures for employees or contractors failing to
meet company standards regarding slavery, and (5) provides company
employees and management, who have direct responsibility for
supply chain management, training on human trafficking and slavery,
particularly with respect to mitigating risks within the product supply
chains. 27
Lastly, the CTSCA establishes that the exclusive remedy for
violation of the law is an action for injunctive relief brought by the
28Attorney General. Furthermore, the law mandates that each year
the Franchise Tax Board will provide the Attorney General, a list of
retail sellers and manufacturers subject to compliance based on tax
29
returns starting from 2011.
III. Efficacy of the CTSCA as Mandated Disclosure Regulation
A. Failures of CTSCA Disclosure Design
It appears there have not been any official evaluations of the
effectiveness of the CTSCA to date, and any such evaluations would
be premature at this stage since the law has only been in effect for
two years, and "the full impact of any new law can take [many] years
to assess properly." 30 As such, this paper is not meant to provide an
assessment of the law's current effect on eradicating forced labor and
slavery from global supply chains. Instead, it analyzes the likely
efficacy of the law by examining both the disclosure regime design
27. Id. at § 1714.43(3)(c)(1-5)[hereinafter, "CTSCA's Five Key Disclosure
Requirements"].
28. Id. at § 1714.43(3)(d) (However, nothing in this section is intended to limit
remedies available for a violation of any other state or federal law). To date, it
appears that no actions that have been brought against any company in violation of
the Act. Kuhn Associates, Sustainability Advisors, LLC, The California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act Information Brief (2013), available at
http://www.kuh
nassociatesllc.com/images/Documents toDownload/CATransparency-inSupply-
ChainsActInformationBrief.pdf.
29. CTSCA at § 1714.43(4)(a)(1-2).
30. Todres, supra note 13, at 95.
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and the way companies are complying with the regulation.
The first element in the framework for a successful transparency
policy is that the regulation dictates a specific policy purpose to
bridge the information gap between the information discloser and the
information user.3 ' Specifically, the goal of the government mandate
is to "provide the public with adequate information to make more
informed and . . . socially beneficial [and responsible] decisions. ,32
However, information asymmetry alone is not sufficient to trigger
government intervention. In most cases, the government intervenes
when the asymmetry gaps lead to well-defined public policy
problems, such as "information imbalances that perpetuate
unacceptable patterns of discrimination or other social inequities"
because "unfair practices that are hidden can deny social benefits
to . .. people." 33
CTSCA meets the policy purpose condition and attempts to
bridge the information gap between disclosers and consumers. For
the CTSCA, the asymmetry lies in the lack of information available to
consumers regarding corporations' labor practices used to sell,
harvest, or manufacture goods purchased by the general public
including foods, apparel and footwear, electronics, household items,
toys, and cosmetics, among others. According to its own terms, the
purpose of CTSCA is to "educate consumers on how to purchase
goods produced by companies that responsibly manage their supply
chains, and, thereb , to improve the lives of victims of slavery and
human trafficking." 4 In other words, the intent of the law is to:
inform consumers ... which companies are acting socially
responsible so that consumers can choose not to patronize those
that are not socially responsible, and to even the playing field for
socially responsible companies that refuse to work with suppliers
that use forced labor in competing against companies that have
reduced costs [due to the use of forced labor.]35
By providing the aforementioned information to consumers, this
disclosure regime forces companies, some for the first time, to
31. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 40.
3 2. Id.
33. Id.
34. CTSCA at § 1714.43(2)6).
35. Jody Katz Pritikin, Esq., Lead Your Industry By Preventing Slavery
and Human Trafficking In the Supply Chain (2011), available at http://proac
tivelawsuitprevention.blogspot.com/2011/11/on-january-1-2012-californias.html.
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scrutinize their supply chains to screen for and eliminate illegal labor
practices which lead to human rights violations against workers. It is
unlikely that such violations would otherwise be uncovered save for
large-scale tragedies that gain national and international media
attention. Therefore, this law meets the first element for an effective
transparency policy.
The second component of a successful transparency policy is a
specified discloser target, or "specific organizations that are viewed as
responsible for [the] public risk or performance problem (and
therefore have unique access to information about it) as disclosers."3 6
"[D]esignated disclosers are frequently businesses, and the same is
true in this case. Here, the specified disclosers are all retail sellers or
manufacturers doing business in the state of California, who have
"annual worldwide gross receipts that exceed one hundred million
dollars ($100,000,000).",3' Although most California corporations do
not themselves employ slave labor directly, this disclosure regime
targets them as the responsible parties for policing practices within
their supply chains. When the companies are either unaware of
labor and human rights violations taking place within their supply
chains, or otherwise blatantly ignore any such knowledge, these
corporate entities exacerbate the slave labor and trafficking problem.
The CTSCA goes even further in specifying the discloser targets
by providing definitions for what it means to be "doing business in
[the] state," what are considered to be "gross receipts," and who are
referred to as "manufacturers" and "retail sellers."4 Identifying who
41
must disclose information can often be politically controversial.
Whether politics played a role in defining the disclosers under this
regime is uncertain. However, the law does not apply to smaller and
medium-sized businesses making less than one hundred million per
42
year in profit, but which may still have egregious human rights
violations within their supply chains. The text of the legislation does
not provide a reason for the exclusion of smaller and moderately-
sized businesses from compliance with the law.
36. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 41.
37. Id.
38. CTSCA at § 1714.43(2)(j).
39. Id. at § 1714.43
40. Id. at § 1714.43(3)(a)(2)(A-D).
41. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 41.
42. Pritikin, supra note 35.
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Targeted transparency policies "do not usually define intended
information users," and most often, users are described as "the
public" in general.4 3 However, "actual users are often self-selected by
their own interests."" Such is the case here in the human trafficking
context as the law describes users as "consumers" generally.45 As the
framework suggests, the users of the California disclosure regime will
be consumers who are either aware of what human trafficking means
and are perhaps already involved in the movement to combat it or
those who have a desire to become involved. Without prior
knowledge on the issue or of the CTSCA specifically, consumers will
not take the time to research company websites for information in
compliance with the disclosure act, and thus, will not become users of
the transparency policy.
A benefit of the broader user groups is that "policies [become]
adaptive to change in the makeup of user groups" and allow
intermediaries such as community groups, activists, and advocates to
act as agents for users.46 This benefit is especially apparent in the
context of forced labor and slavery through an application such as the
Free2Work campaign, which acts as an information intermediary,
digesting and repackaging the disclosed information in a way that is
more useful to the consumer. Free2Work has provided a tangible
tool for consumers to use while shopping by scanning the bar codes of
retail products into a mobile application to access a company "grade"
or rating along with information on the labor practices of the
corporation.4 7 This information is in turn useful for the empowered
consumer's purchasing decision, allowing consumers to limit
purchases of goods produced under illegal and inhumane labor
conditions, and instead to reward companies who are socially
responsible by increasing purchases of their products. Thus, the
CTSCA also meets the second condition of the transparency policy
framework because it adequately specifies discloser targets.
The third condition required for successful transparency policy
regulation is a "defined scope" of information, which "specif[ies] the
universe of practices, substances, activities [and] other information" to
43. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 42.
44. Id
45. CTSCA at § 1714.43(2)(j).
46. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20 at 42.
47. FREE2WORK, supra, note 10.
2014] 359
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
be disclosed.4 The content to be disclosed must be related to the
nature of the information asymmetry intended to be redressed.49 As
noted above, the CTSCA's Five Key Disclosure Requirementsso clearly
explicate specific points of information that disclosers are required to
report on their website in order to be in compliance with the law.
While the CTSCA's Five Key Disclosure Requirementss' are
more detailed than many disclosure regimes, some of the
requirements are still vague in problematic ways. For instance, the
third provision under the CTSCA section (3)(c)(3) asks companies to
disclose whether and to what extent they require their direct suppliers
to certify that materials and component parts integrated into the
creation or manufacture of end products comply with anti-slavery
laws in the "country or countries in which [the companies] are doing
business." 52
First, there is no definition in the law provided for what the
legislature means by "direct suppliers." "Direct suppliers" could be
interpreted to mean factories which employ laborers to create basic
elements necessary for the production of larger, more complex goods
or those that assemble the final products. For example, direct
suppliers for electronics companies such as Apple, would be the
businesses which are contracted to provide hardware parts for
manufacturing computers or cell phones or assembling the end
product, such as Foxconn. However, under an alternate interpretation,
"direct suppliers" could mean the local subcontractors and companies
which oversee the procurement of raw materials. Under this
definition, direct suppliers would include companies overseeing the
mining of coltan, a metallic ore from which tantalum is extracted to
be used in electronics products. 53 Similarly, various interpretations
can be made of the term "direct suppliers" in the apparel industry.
Are the direct suppliers those who oversee cotton picking from the
fields, or factories which eniploy workers to use that cotton to make
clothing? Without a concrete definition for the term "direct
48. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 42.
49. Id.
50. See CTSCA, supra note 27.
51. Id.
52. CTSCA at § 1714.43(3)(c)(3).
53. Tiffany Ma, China and Congo's Coltan Connection, PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE
1, 2009, available at http://www.project2049.net/documents/china-and-congos_co
Itan connection.pdf.
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suppliers", corporations are given discretion to interpret the term in
the way that is most beneficial to them, which often leads them to
select the definition which is most narrow in scope, and doing so
impedes the communication of important information to consumer
users of the disclosure.
Another problem with section (3)(c)(3) of the CTSCA is the lack
of clarity around which country's laws direct suppliers must follow.
Under this provision, corporations must disclose to what extent, if
any, they require direct suppliers to certify "that materials
incorporated into the product comply with the laws regarding slavery
and human trafficking of the country or countries in which they are
doing business." However, it is unclear whether this language
requires direct suppliers to comply solely with the laws of the
production country, or also with the laws of the final destination
country where the completed product is sold.54 The language is also
vague in identifying what type of certification is required (written or
other), and whether there is a standard form of certification to be
used across suppliers.55 Again, the law's ambiguous language of what
is to be disclosed can lead to insufficient disclosure of relevant
information for a consumer trying to make a socially responsible
purchasing decision.
For companies who are subject to the CTSCA, the five key
disclosure requirements56 outlined by law should already be
information which is tracked or known to the discloser because
ideally, such data should be "generated for internal purposes or for
experts or other ... users," perhaps for internal audits and
evaluations. 7 However, for some companies, the mandated scope of
information may require new data to be generated that are not
readily available, which may force businesses to establish new systems
of monitoring, measuring, evaluating, and reporting. For the most
part, whether the information is already tracked or requires new data
generation, this law adequately satisfies the "defined scope"
requirement for what information must be disclosed.
One caveat: despite satisfying the scope requirement, the CTSCA
58
merely mandates disclosure of information, which means that "[a]
54. Kuhn Associates, supra note 28.
55. Id.
56. CTSCA Five Key Disclosure Requirements, supra note 27.
57. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 42.
58. CTSCA § 1743.43 (the Act contains no language to compel companies to take
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company theoretically could simply state that it does not take any
action, [nor have any policy to eradicate human trafficking and forced
labor from its supply chain] and still be in compliance with the Act,"5 9
without incurring any legal ramifications. This lack of legal
consequences is problematic because companies that have not taken
action are not incentivized to change their status quo, to investigate
supply chains, or to implement strategies to eradicate human
trafficking.
While companies can simultaneously satisfy CTSCA legal
requirements but not take steps towards eradication, it is in the best
interest of the company to "implement measures that would enable it
to confirm that it is meeting the intent of the [law]," since simply
stating that the discloser does not take any action could have
significant consequences on the company's reputation, due to public
scrutiny, and a negative image could be more costly to the company
in the long term.60 While the caveat61 may be great from a company's
operating perspective, on the whole, it is a negative attribute of the
CTSCA because it contradicts the overall intent of the law to help
eliminate human trafficking from supply chains.
The fourth element for a successful transparency regime is a
"defined information structure and vehicle," which specifies a
"framework that standardizes content and format" of the disclosures
so that information is comparable across products and institutions. 62
An effective framework specifies the time, place, and means by which
information will be provided by explicating the metrics, frequency of
disclosure, and the communication vehicle.
The structure and vehicle framework of the CTSCA is weak, and
thus, does not provide uniformity in disclosures across companies.
This lack of cohesiveness is problematic for consumers on the user
end, who will not have accurate points of reference for which
companies are making substantial efforts to ensure their supply
specific actions or concrete steps towards eradicating human trafficking beyond the
posting of the disclosure).
59. Timothy G. Hoxie et al., California Transparency in Supply Chains Act New
Disclosure Requirements for Companies Doing Business in California to Take Effect
January 1, 2012, JONES DAY (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.jonesday.com/
california.transparency/. See Todres at 96, supra note 13.
60. Timothy G. Hoxie et al., supra note 56. See Todres, supra note 13, at 96.
61. See CTSCA § 1743.43. Hoxie et al., supra note 59.
62. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 43.
63. Id.
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chains are free from human trafficking. In other words, due to the
range of potential disclosure formats, consumers will have no way to
compare not only company compliance with the legal mandate, but
also which companies meet the consumers' standards of social
responsibility for eradicating slavery and labor trafficking.
First, although the qualitative metrics of the CTSCA require
disclosers to post the steps they are taking to eradicate human
trafficking and slavery from their supply chains, the law does not
require companies to disclose for example, how often and what kind
of internal and/or external audits are conducted, what type of
employee and management training is provided, what kind of
certification of component materials is required, and how many and
what kinds of internal accountability standards and procedures are
provided, among other possible metrics.
Second, nowhere in the law is there a provision regarding the
frequency with which disclosers must update their compliance
information, which means that once a company has posted the initial
disclosure on its website, its compliance requirements are complete.
This flaw in the regulation will lead to outdated information on
company websites, particularly for companies which have fallen
below the threshold for appropriate measures to combat the human
trafficking problem. As a consequence of inaccurate or outdated
disclosure information, consumers would be misled in their attempts
to make socially responsible purchasing decisions.
Third, the vehicle or means of communication under the CTSCA
is the discloser's website, and specifically, companies must have, a
"conspicuous and easily understood link," on their homepage, to the
compliancy information; otherwise in the event that a website is not
available, companies shall provide "the written disclosure within 30
days of receiving a written request for the disclosure from a
consumer."6 "Vehicles of disclosure are more than merely
administrative details" and for optimal success, they should be
decided with much forethought and analysis because "[t]hey have
profound [policy] impacts ... [since] they determine when a user
encounters information that influences decision making."6 5
In the context of human trafficking, there are two major
problems with the means of disclosure being the company website
64. CTSCA at § 1714.43(3)(b).
65. FUNG ET AL. supra note 20, at 44.
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under this transparency regime. First, a successful "conspicuous" and
clearly identifiable link on the corporate homepage should include an
explicit title referencing the "California Transparency in Supply
Chains Act" or some variation of the language from the law.
However, not all companies subject to this law follow such a method.
Second, subsidiary companies subject to compliance under the law
often have their disclosure on a parent company website, which can
be problematic for consumers who may be unfamiliar with parent
companies, or how to identify the parent company of a particular
subsidiary. For example, PepsiCo is the parent company for a
multitude of brands including Pepsi-Cola, Frito-Lay, Tropicana,
Quaker, and Gatorade, all of which further produce specific
66
products. Therefore, when searching for the disclosure compliance
for a specific product within one of the aforementioned brands, the
consumer would have to search on the PepsiCo website. The pitfalls
of the CTSCA in establishing an effective framework for the metrics,
frequency, and means of information communication to the consumer
will render the regime ineffective.
The final element for a robust transparency policy is
enforcement. "Monitoring nonreporting or misreporting and then
levying penalties for ... violat[ors of] disclosure requirements remain
essential."67 Thus, "the government must develop methods to
monitor compliance with disclosure [regulations]."68 The CTSCA has
an extremely weak enforcement mechanism, if it is considered to have
one at all. According to its own terms, the law requires the Franchise
Tax Board to provide to the Attorney General, on an annual basis, a
list of companies subject to compliance under the law, and the
"exclusive remedy for a violation [of the law is] an action brought by
the Attorney General for injunctive relief." 69 Companies subject to
compliance with the transparency policy are to be identified through
filed tax returns demonstrating whether the corporation exceeds gross
annual profits of one hundred million dollars. Thus this law does
not mandate company action consistent with the information
disclosed. The CTSCA does not monitor if companies are disclosing
truthful and accurate information regarding steps taken to eradicate
66. PEPSICO, http://www.pepsico.com./Brands.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
67. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 45.
68. Id.
69. CTSCA at § 1714.43(4)(a)(1-2); Todres, supra note 13, at 95.
7 0. Id.
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human trafficking from supply chains, meaning whether companies
are actually carrying out the eradication methods they purport to
employ.
Furthermore, the transparency regime does not establish a
financial penalty scheme for violations by companies who fail to
disclose the required information on their websites. One informal
enforcement mechanism, which the law provides by virtue of being a
disclosure mandate, is the reputational stake of companies who would
receive negative press for discovered incidents of labor trafficking or
other violations of human and labor rights, along with any potential
profit losses that the company may sustain as a consequence of
consumer choices in response to the uncovered violations. However,
without more robust enforcement mechanisms and concrete,
substantial penalties for violating the law, the CTSCA will be
ineffective as a transparency regulation.
B. Lack of Information Embeddedness in Consumer Purchasing
Decisions
In addition to the five key conditions required for a successful
transparency regime design, transparency policies will be effective only
if the information disclosed becomes embedded in both users' and
disclosers' behaviors.71 This phenomenon is the targeted transparency
action cycle, whereby the new information from the mandated
disclosure becomes internalized in user decisions, which leads to a
72
response to the disclosure. As a result, the user's response may
facilitate a new response from the discloser in return, based similarly
on the discloser's perceived value, compatibility, and comprehension of
the user's response. "A [transparency] policy has effects when the
information it produces enters the calculus of users and they
consequently change their actions... [a] system is effective, however,
only when discloser responses significantly advance policy aims." 73
"For transparency systems to be effective, it is necessary ... that
information become embedded" into "users' decision-making
routines."74 This is accomplished through three key factors: (1) the
perceived value of the disclosed information in achieving the users'
goals, (2) the compatibility of the information with the users' decision-
71. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 54-55.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 55.
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making routines, and (3) the comprehensibility of the new information.
While the CTSCA will provide valuable information to consumers who
are seeking to make socially responsible purchasing decisions, investors
and shareholders who seek to invest in socially responsible companies,76
and to a general public audience interested in issues of labor trafficking,
the disclosed information is neither compatible with users' daily routines,
nor is it sufficiently comprehensible to adequately become embedded in
user decision-making.
First, the CTSCA will provide valuable information to
consumers whose goals are to make socially responsible purchasing
decisions, which do not inadvertently contribute to and condone labor
trafficking by purchasing from companies which employ forced labor
and slavery. Because the law requires companies to make disclosures
regarding five specific steps they are undertaking to eradicate human
trafficking from their supply chains, the disclosure should provide
consumers with enough information to make appropriate purchasing
decisions. Even if companies fail to disclose or disclose nothing other
than the fact that they take no actions to monitor their supply chains
for trafficking and forced labor, this information would still be
valuable to the user, who can choose not to purchase from such a
company. Moreover, because the law covers so many companies,
the information provided by the CTSCA disclosure regime will
hopefully help to alleviate the potential problem of consumers having
few meaningful choices78 of socially responsible companies. In
theory, the law should provide specific information on the supply
chain practices of up to 3,200 corporations,79 which would likely
include many companies that sell food items, apparel, electronics, and
other products that consumers use on a daily basis.
While there is substantial value to the information provided
75. Id
76. Although, by its terms, the law does not seem to include investors and
shareholders into its intended audience, and explicitly states that the disclosure is
meant to "to educate consumers on how to purchase goods produced by companies
that responsibly manage their supply chains, and, thereby, to improve the lives of
victims of slavery and human trafficking." § 1714.43(2)0). Thus, this analysis focuses
on the consumers as the primary users.
77. Press Release, Christian Brothers Investment Services Leads Investor
Coalition to Encourage Governor's Support of California Supply Chain
Transparency Bill [hereinafter CBIS] (Sept. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.cbisonline.com/p age.asp?id=1062.
78. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20 at 56.
79. CBIS, supra note 77.
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under the CTSCA, this value may be outweighed by "the cost of
acquiring and using [the disclosed] information, which [may not be]
low enough to justify users' efforts in relation to expected benefits.'
To the everyday, general consumer (as opposed to the consumer who
knows and cares about labor trafficking issues), the benefit for
purchasing goods which have been produced in conditions without
forced labor or slavery is indirect and minimal in the short-term,
other than perhaps the immediate moral satisfaction. This intangible
value of the information provided under the CTSCA may not
outweigh the cost to consumers of having to research company
websites to find disclosures, or for those who do not have computers,
to wait for many companies' hard copies of the disclosures to be sent
to their doors, before having to make purchasing decisions. After all,
while morally repugnant, forced labor does not impact the immediate
well-being of the consumer him or herself. Disclosure may work best
when consumers' own health or welfare is impacted, rather than the
health or welfare of others.
Despite its potential value, the information disclosed by
companies under the CTSCA is not "compatible with the usual ways
that [consumers] go about making their [purchasing] decisions' 82
because the "format and time and place of [the] availability"83 of the
disclosure does not coincide with the time and place of the purchasing
decision. For the CTSCA disclosures to be compatible with
consumers' purchasing decisions, information users would need to have
immediate access to the aforementioned disclosures, just before, or at
the exact moment that purchasing decisions are made in stores.
However, as the law stands, the time and place of the disclosure is
80. Id.
81. A telling contrast can be made here between the impacts to the consumer of
the CTSCA and "[tlargeted transparency's poster child[,] restaurant sanitation
grading" in Los Angeles. "The central idea [of restaurant grading] is to summarize
sanitation inspections with letter grades ('A,' 'B,' or 'C') and post these in entryways
of restaurants to succinctly and intuitively inform consumers. In theory, the
disclosure helps consumers select restaurants based on health risk, which in turn
incentivizes restaurants to clean up." Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information
Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574, 582 (2012). Under the LA
restaurant grading disclosure regime, the consumers' health is affected in a very
immediate way, based on their decision of which restaurants to patron. In the case of
the CTSCA, however, the impact on the consumer is completely indirect, which
weakens the law's effectiveness.
82. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 55.
83. Id.
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incompatible with consumers' daily routines. Having companies post
the disclosure as a link on the homepage of their website is not a useful
format for everyday consumers who often make urchasing decisions
in the moment, during the shopping process. Therefore, the
disclosure information cannot be properly embedded into users'
decisions, leaving the disclosure regime ineffective. However, it is
important to recognize that as technology advances and globalization
continues, more consumers are purchasing items through the internet.
For these users, the online disclosure may indeed be the exact place to
effect change in their purchasing decisions. In the end, the disclosed
information under the CTSCA would still be incompatible with the
many users who complete their shopping in stores.
Lastly, the information disclosed under California's new law will
not become embedded into everyday consumer purchasing routines
because it is unlikely that consumers will "have the capacity to relate
[the information] to the decisions they face" as "complexity of
information often creates a barrier to comprehension."85 From the
average consumer's perspective, the disclosure information required
by the CTSCA will be presented in a complex manner.
For example, the law requires information about supply chain
audits (internal and external), internal accountability, verification and
evaluation of supply chains to address human trafficking risks, and
certification of product materials. This information may be presented
to the user in a way that does not relay whether forced labor or
slavery is actually being employed in the process of manufacturing a
product. Also, consumers may not understand the difference
between direct and indirect suppliers, which can inhibit their
understanding of where in the supply chain labor problems exist, and
how those inhumane practices are relevant to the end product
purchased by the consumer.
Since the CTSCA is unlikely to be embedded into user decisions,
this failure will significantly reduce the likelihood that the law will
become doubly embedded, meaning disclosers will either not
incorporate or will incorrectly incorporate misinterpreted user
responses to the new information into the company decision calculus
84. Often, consumer behavior is exhibited in the moment, and many consumers
make shopping decisions in the store, and once they reach the point of purchase. See
generally TIMoTHY M. DEVINNEY ET AL., The Myth of the Ethical Consumer 37-48
(2010).
85. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 59.
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for their own practices. 86 "Disclosers will change their practices only
if they perceive that shifts in user behavior will have an impact on
[the companies'] core organizational goals" such as "enhanced
profitability, market share, and reputation."87
Essentially, in order for companies to continue to undertake or
enhance current steps taken to eradicate human trafficking from their
supply chains, the corporations would have to see a significant
reduction or a significant increase in profitability specifically as a
result of consumers' reactions to the website disclosures. If
companies do not perceive changing consumer purchasing trends to
be a direct result of the disclosure mechanism under the CTSCA,
then companies are not likely to continue to disclose and update on
their websites, existing information regarding their labor practices.
Companies are even less likely to make actual changes to their supply
chain operations to eradicate human trafficking (despite information
indicated on website disclosures).
However, if companies do properly equate changes in consumer
purchases and company profitability, as well as the potential for bad
publicity and pressure from advocacy groups, to user responses to the
disclosure regime, company executives will have a stronger incentive
to focus on and respond to supply chain issues of human trafficking
and slavery, many for the first time." For the reasons stated above,
information disclosed under the CTSCA is unlikely to become
embedded in most consumers' purchasing decisions.
III. Intermediaries Help to Bridge Gaps in the CTSCA
Shortcomings of the CTSCA, such as lack of information
embeddedness in consumer purchasing decisions, can be mitigated by
intermediaries. Intermediaries such as grassroots community groups,
activists, and advocates, act as agents for users, bringing the
information to the users' fingertips through trainings and mobile
applications. A prime example of such an intermediary in the labor
trafficking context is the Free2Work (F2W) campaign, an operation
of Not For Sale, a non-profit organization which "evaluatels] the use
of forced labor in mainstream supply chains, offer[s] social services to
86. Id. at 65.
87. Id. at 66.
88. This would be similar to the response to the legislation disclosure regime for
toxic pollution reports explicated by FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 67.
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survivors and those at-risk to human trafficking, and creat[es]
enterprise for vulnerable communities."89
The F2W campaign includes a website and an iPhone
application, which "allows shoppers to scan a product barcode and
get an instant rating of the manufacturer's track record on human
rights and other labor issues." 90 "F2W provides letter-grade ratings
and brand comparisons of companies across a number of sectors,
including apparel, electronics, shoes, and chocolates. Grades are
assigned by ... researchers who evaluate company policies,
transparency and traceability, monitoring and training, and worker
rights."91 An important nuance to note about this intermediary entity
is that a poor overall grade rating under F2W does not mean that the
company employs slave labor, but instead that the company has "no
process or management system in place to prevent workers from
being abused."9 Thus, the F2W campaign addresses the exact
concerns and mandated disclosures of the CTSCA by grading
companies' "zero-tolerance policies against trafficking." 93
F2W is an important intermediary for alleviating the pitfalls
posed by the ineffectiveness of the CTSCA. First, the law on its own
will not allow for information to be embedded into users' daily
routines because consumers will not "likely invest time and effort in
integrating new information into their choices when they perceive
[little] substantial immediate or long-term gain."94 F2W effectively
facilitates the integration of the law's disclosed information into
everyday shopping decisions because the application can be accessed
directly from the store where the consumer can make a more
informed purchasing decision by taking into account corporate social
responsibility.
IV. Advantages to the CTSCA Disclosure Regime
Despite the law's limited ability to eradicate human trafficking
from global business supply chains, some practitioners argue that the
89. NOT FOR SALE, http://www.notforsalecampaign.org/about/ (last visited Apr.
15, 2014).
90. Susie Boss, What's Next: New App for Conscious Consumers, STANFORD
SOCIAL INNOVATION REv. 56, 58(2012).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 56.
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CTSCA could encourage companies to go beyond simply disclosing
the mandated steps, and should also compel companies to consider
"the impact their actions will have on human rights organizations,
consumers, investors, and other interested parties." 95 Practitioners
argue the law may lead corporations to make substantial efforts to
raise awareness about labor trafficking and slavery, such as:
circulating press releases and launching public relations campaigns, as
well as training suppliers to audit company supply chains and prevent
human trafficking situations.
Furthermore, practitioners believe CTSCA will lead companies
to "ensur[e] that there are multiple avenues [both internally and
externally] for employees to file grievances in the event that they are
aware of unsafe work[ing] conditions, unfair labor practices and other
conditions which give rise to human trafficking." 96 There is scholarly
support for these views. Even if information disclosure does not
directly cause an action cycle, it can help spawn political organizing
and activism as political and economic pathways often intertwine "as
community pressure translates into reputational damage." 97
Lastly, even if the CTSCA does not immediately transform
individual user purchasing decisions, the law may be useful in
educating and alerting companies to labor practices in their own
supply chains as well as educating consumers on the issues of labor
trafficking in general.98 The [law can also be used to compel greater
awareness by requiring training and education of individuals working
in sectors where they might come into contact with trafficked
individuals so that they are better positioned to prevent the harm or
ensure earlier intervention." 99 Thus, there is educational value in
properly executed disclosures,'0 which in this case would still fulfill
the purpose of the law in educating and empowering consumers'
decisions in the long-term.
95. Anthony R. Klein et al., The California Transparency in Supply
Chains Act (SB 657), LATHAM & WATKINS 4 (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.1w.com/upload/pubContent/-pdf/pub4481_1.pdf.
96. Pritikin, supra note 35; See also VERITE, Fair Hiring Toolkit, available at
http://www.verite.org/helpwanted/toolkit (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
97. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 47.
98. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 732-34 (2011).
99. Todres, supra note 13, at 94.
100. Id.
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V. Improvements to the CTSCA to Maximize Effectiveness
As a targeted transparency policy, the CTSCA will "introduce
important new information about [the] risk[s]"'o' associated with
labor trafficking in business supply chains and the human rights
practices of consumers' favorite retail sellers "into [users'] established
decision-making processes." 102  However, to maximize the law's
effectiveness in eradicating forced labor and slavery from supply
chains by affecting consumer purchasing decisions, the information
provided by the disclosures must "become an intrinsic part of the
decision-making routines of users and disclosers."10 3
While the CTSCA has a clear and specific policy purpose and
sufficiently explicates and defines discloser targets, the law could
better effectuate embeddedness by expanding its defined scope. The
CTSCA can expand its defined scope by: providing definitions for
terms within the disclosure provisions, enhancing the means of the
information communication by making the time and place of the
disclosure coincide with the time at which consumers are making
purchasing decisions, and by enacting more robust enforcement
mechanisms for the law. Furthermore, the legislature should provide
additional definitions for ambiguous words in the language of the law.
For example, clearly explaining who "direct suppliers" are would help
to notify companies subject to the law, about which contractors or
businesses in their supply chains they must disclose certification
information. Specifically, the CTSCA would be a more rigorous
disclosure regime if the law stated that companies must disclose
information about whether all of their suppliers certify whether all
materials or component parts of final products are made without the
use of forced or slave labor.104 Similarly, legislators should more
clearly define which countries' labor laws must be followed at every
105stage throughout the production process.
To enhance the means of information communication, legislators
should implement under the CTSCA a grading or rating system to
evaluate company disclosures, and provide to users more beneficial
information for their purchasing decisions. Because the CTSCA is a
101. FUNG ET AL., supra note 20, at 90.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Pritikin, supra note 35.
105. Id.
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disclosure regime, and not a law that mandates companies to actually
take the steps they purport to take in eradicating trafficking from
their supply chains, a more helpful regime, at the least, would have a
grading system to evaluate the sufficiency of disclosures in their
amount and usefulness of transparency. Additionally, embeddedness
would be further facilitated if supply chain disclosures were posted in
store entryways, and consumers were urged to read them at the time
of making a purchasing decision, or for the online shoppers, if
disclosures were more easily accessible on company websites with
clear titles referencing their compliance with the CTSCA. Lastly,
unifying disclosure formats across companies (in both the terms used
to disclose information on websites, as well as in a rating system)
would allow consumers to compare different products both within
and across sectors and larger product lines.
The CTSCA would also benefit significantly from robust
evaluation mechanisms. At present, the body tasked with checking
company compliance is the Tax Franchise Board, merely by supplying
the California Attorney General with a list of companies that are
subject to disclosure under the CTSCA. However, the disclosure
regime would be more effective if a newly created task force or other
existing organization was charged with (1) creating an evaluation tool
for measuring uniformity of disclosures, (2) establishing guidelines for
how to adequately comply with each disclosure provision and set forth
the kind of information that would reach at least a satisfactory level of
compliance, (3) promulgating standards for consistent and interval
disclosure updates based on changed (improved or worsened company
practices), (4) measuring the effectiveness of the regime over time by
conducting studies on whether consumers are aware of, actually read,
and understand the information provided in the disclosures, and how
the information has affected users' purchasing decisions, and (5)
evaluating whether companies are in fact implementing the measures
to eradicate human trafficking from their supply chains, which they
disclose to take on their websites.106
Lastly, the CTSCA can improve embeddedness in the action
cycle by strengthening its enforcement mechanisms. As some
106. Independent auditor companies and labor organizations exist to conduct
periodic external and internal audits of companies to investigate their compliance
with other labor standards such as those of the International Labor Organization, for
example. However, nothing in the CTSCA requires any such auditors or
investigators to account for the direct translation of disclosure information under the
law into practice in the supply chain.
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scholars suggest, the current enforcement tool, injunctions, "may
affect the reputation of a retailer or manufacturer and therefore be an
effective incentive for complying with the CTSCA."107 However,
imposing an injunction requires an action to be brought against a
corporation for noncompliance with the CTSCA, and no such actions
have been brought to date,os despite the fact that not all companies
subject to the law are complying with it.109  Thus, additional
consequences for violation, such as a graduating scale of financial
penalties for first and subsequent instances of human trafficking,
would provide even stronger incentives for companies to adequately
disclose their efforts to eradicate slave labor from their supply chains.
Furthermore, the CTSCA should incorporate into its enforcement
apparatus, provisions and/or steps for how companies should bring
non-compliant suppliers into compliance with industry standards for
labor conditions which do not employ human trafficking methods,
instead of terminating their relationships with non-compliant
suppliers, who will subsequently contract with another company and
continue to employ forced labor if doing so yields profits without
significant or measurable consequences.
V. Conclusion
The CTSCA of 2010, which took effect in January 2012, was an
effort by legislators to push companies to evaluate their supply chains
to address risks of human trafficking and slavery. By requiring large
corporations (with gross annual profits exceeding one hundred
million dollars) to disclose to consumers, on their company websites,
107. "In addition, the CTSCA will indirectly prompt companies to enhance clauses
in supply contracts, ultimately leading to greater protection for companies from
liability caused by the behaviour of their suppliers. . . [and, c]ompanies that cannot
account for the provenance of their products may soon find themselves losing
competitiveness to companies that can. They may also be exposed to costly
litigation." John Pickles & Shengjun Zhu, The California Transparency in Supply
Chains Act 4-5 (Capturing the Gains, Working Paper No. 15, 2013 Working Paper
15), available at http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg-wp-2013-15.pdf.
108. Id. at 7; Kuhn Associates, supra note 28.
109. Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Know the Chain - See which
companies do and do not have statements under the California Transparency in
Supply Chains Act (SB-657)(2014), available at http://www.businesshum
anrights.org/Documents/KnowTheChain. See also, Press Release, The Corporate
Social Responsibility Newswire (CSRwire), 85 firms still "silent" on California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act (Feb. 12, 2014), available at http://www.csrwire.
com/press releases/36712-85-firms-still-silent-on-California-Transparency-in-Supply-
Chains-Act.
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specific steps they are undertaking to eradicate human trafficking
from their supply chains, the State of California sought to curb human
trafficking by empowering consumers with necessary information to
change their purchasing decisions to reward socially responsible
companies and essentially penalize those employing forced labor and
slavery to manufacture products. While this law is a positive step in
combating human trafficking because of its potential to increase
consumer awareness and activism to pressure companies to use
socially responsible labor practices, the transparency policy is likely to
be ineffective because it fails to meet crucial elements for a successful
disclosure regime and will be unlikely to embed itself in the decision
making processes of consumers and companies in a way that changes
their behavior.
For curbing human trafficking in business supply chains, the
CTSCA, albeit a domestic state law, has international implications in
the sense that "US-based manufacturers and retailers with overseas
supply chains now have to ensure compliance with all aspects of [the
law] ... along their entire supply chains " and "foreign companies
that do a significant amount of business in California ... must also
abide by the Act to operate in California or to supply retail partners
within the state."110 Because positive international spillover effects
implicate the potential for a transnational regime modeled on the
CTSCA, understanding the strengths and shortcomings of the
domestic law is crucial, and any transnational disclosure regime
should be undertaken with these critiques in mind.
110. Pickles & Zhu, supra note 107, at 7.
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T his collection of essays, speeches and ruminations spans 25 years ofDaniel's Schorr's remarkable half-century career. He is in a unique position - from
decades of covering the most influential stories of our lifetime - to provide insight in the
evolution of modem American journalism as well as a rare look at himself, the man behind
the news story, one of modem journalism's founding fathers.
Vietnam and Watergate, the Cold War, national and international politics - literally the
biggest stories of our times - has been Daniel Schorr's "beat." Forgive Us Our Press
Passes contains Daniel Schorr's reflections on the role of media in society, the effects of
television on the development of the journalistic craft, privacy and secrecy, the First
Amendment, and government suppression of information.
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material opened at Hastings in October 1987.
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by Thomas Garden Barnes
This centennial celebration
of Hastings College of the
Law, published in 1978 at the
100th anniversary of the col-
lege, tracing the development
of an extraordinary institut-
tion, born in pre-Gold Rush
San Francisco,. It is the story
of a maverick law school and
of the distinctive personalities
who have driven its long and
colorful history.
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commerce/cgi-bin/commerce.cgi?listcategories
For more information:
scholarp@uchastings.edu
!? _- cji Gmtkn N Ar, : -
Hastings West-Northwest Journal of
Environmental Law and Policy's
ANTHOLOGY
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